Abstract : In this paper, we propose a novel risk-limiting real-time pricing mechanism for a regional electricity network of prosumers with distributed solar power generation. The target system is a regional electricity network that consists of many prosumers, each equipped with a battery and a renewable energy-based generator. In particular, we assume that each prosumer is in possession of a solar power generator, i.e., photovoltaic cells. In the proposed market mechanism, each prosumer sets an asking price and bids for the amount of electricity that he/she sells or buys, In addition, he/she sets an asking price and bids for a parameter to cope with the uncertainty induced by solar power generation in a dayahead market, as well. It is a characteristic of regional electricity networks of prosumers that there is a strong correlation in the solar power generation of each house within a network. A market mechanism for a regional electricity network of prosumers with distributed solar power generation should consider such characteristics. The performance of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated numerically through a simulation experiment. It outperformed a conventional realtime pricing method that does not consider uncertainty, and a method that does not involve trading of the parameter for coping with uncertainty.
Introduction
A wide range of smart grid technologies including real-time pricing market mechanisms for electricity networks have recently been studied [1] - [5] . To employ renewable energy resources effectively and efficiently, future electricity networks should be compatible with renewable-based distributed energy resources (DERs), such as photovoltaic (PV) cells and wind turbines. A representative characteristic of DERs is that electricity can be locally generated and locally consumed, in contrast with nuclear power and thermally generated power based on fossil fuels, which are usually located far from the consuming populations. This characteristic naturally allows us to form electricity networks of prosumers [6] - [8] . A prosumer refers to a consumer who is also a producer [9] . Especially in Japan, current electricity networks are essentially regionally monopolized, and electricity is delivered from generators to consumers unilaterally. However, in future electricity networks based on renewable energies, electricity can be delivered to a variety of prosumers bilaterally.
Based on this background, we focus in this paper on a network of prosumers in which people locally produce electricity using renewable energy resources, and also consume this electricity locally. In particular, we investigate a regional decentralized electricity network of prosumers, named an inter-intelligent renewable energy network (i-Rene) [10] , which is based mainly on PVs. A figure to illustrate i-Rene is presented in Fig. 1 . We assume that each house has a PV and a battery. An i-Rene is assumed to approximately contain between ten and several thousand houses. In addition, each house has a smart meter involving a software agent that is able to communicate with other agents and trade electricity automatically via a regional electricity market. The software agent also controls the battery and time-shiftable loads [11] - [13] . This means that, to a certain extent, the agent is able to alter the electricity demand of the house. The i-Rene is similar to an island-style electricity network, but has several differences. An island-style electricity network is independent from other grids. The power grid will experience a blackout if it is truly an island-style electricity network, and if the supply of power is short compared to the aggregated demand in the regional network. To mitigate this problem, i-Rene is connected to an additional outside power grid via a gateway. The outside grid is regarded as a backup power supply for the i-Rene. The prosumers in i-Rene can buy electricity from the outside grid. The price of electricity bought from the outside grid is considered to be fixed, and cannot be changed by the prosumers in i-Rene.
One of the central issues of in electricity networks involving many DERs such as i-Rene is how to meet demand and supply at each time slot. To balance demand and supply in electricity networks involving many DERs, decentralized control methods that use a market mechanism have been the subject of attention in related fields [1] - [5] , [14] - [17] . Many researchers have conducted a variety of studies on market-based demand side management (DSM) for conventional electricity networks, in which generators and consumers are completely distinguished and electricity is provided unilaterally from the generators to the consumers in an electricity grid. Control theory and game theory have provided the mathematical foundation for market- Fig. 1 Overview of i-Rene (top) and power flow and variable definitions in the i-Rene mathematical model (bottom) [7] .
based DSMs [3] , [4] , [15] , [18] - [26] . Fukui et al. proposed the application of DSM with dual decomposition for i-Rene, and provided a convergence error analysis [27] . Dual decomposition is a mathematical technique that can transform central optimization problems into decentralized optimization problems. Dual decomposition relaxes a network constraint in a primal problem using Lagrange multipliers, obtains a dual problem, and decomposes this into a master problem and many sub problems. The master and sub problems are connected using Lagrange multipliers. Interestingly, the Lagrange multipliers are found to be "price profiles" [28] . Using the characteristics of the dual decomposition, many pricing mechanisms have been proposed that can manage electricity networks [4] , [22] - [26] . An intuitive tutorial is provided by Palomar et al. [28] . The study of Fukui et al. is regarded as an extension of that of Samadi et al. [4] , [27] . Taniguchi et al. proposed linear function submission-based double auction mechanism for i-Rene, and demonstrated its theoretical relation to the dual decomposition-based pricing mechanism and its convergence property [7] , [29] .
The above mentioned market mechanisms for regional prosumers' network, e.g., i-Rene, however, did not consider the uncertainty of PV generation which is critical for i-Rene. In developing a reasonable and applicable market-based DSM for i-Rene, we must address the following two major concerns:
Uncertainty The generation profile of a PV cannot be completely predicted, and fluctuates at every moment.
Correlation
The generation profiles of the PVs for each house correlate highly with each other in a regional electricity network.
In a regional electricity network, houses are located in the same neighborhood. Therefore, they share the same weather and flux of solar radiation. This means that the weather introduces uncertainty and strong correlation to the generation profiles, e.g., when the sky becomes cloudy for one house and the generation of the PV of that house decreases, the same occurs for other houses and the generation of their PVs also decreases. No mechanisms developed for i-Rene so far have dealt with both of these important factors, i.e., uncertainty and strong correlation. Yo et al. proposed a risk-limiting electricity dispatch method using a market mechanism [17] . In their mechanism, a dispatchable power provider attempts to deal with uncertainty, i.e., "risk," in an aggregate load, i.e., demand. For this purpose, the dispatcher trades not only the expectation of future supply and load, i.e., amounts of electricity, but also the standard deviation, i.e., "risk," at a day-ahead market. By introducing chance constraints and reducing to an expected cost minimization problem, they employed dual decomposition and derived a market mechanism that can deal with uncertainty in a fluctuating net demand in a power grid. They endowed the electricity grid with a realtime market-like function by which each generator can change their behavior and income in a real-time manner by referring to the fluctuating demand.
However, this model does not consider a regional network of prosumers, i.e., trading behavior between consumers in a network, or the strong correlation among distributed PVs. Although several studies have been conducted in relation to market mechanisms for electricity networks with uncertainty, no market mechanism has so far been proposed for a regional network of prosumers that considers both the uncertainty and strong correlation described above [17] , [30] - [32] .
In this paper, we propose a new market mechanism that can deal with the unexpected fluctuation of PVs in a regional power grid of prosumers. We also demonstrate the capabilities of the proposed approach through simulations.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• A new mechanism for i-Rene that can consider uncertainty and chance constraints.
• A new market mechanism for trading risk in i-Rene that explicitly deals with the strong correlation in PV generation in a regional electricity network.
• A numerical experiment the effectiveness of the proposed method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our target model and proposed mechanism. Section 3 describes the numerical experiment. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Target Model and Pricing Mechanism
In this section, we describe a target model to represent the target decentralized electricity network of prosumers, i-Rene. Based on this model, we describe the proposed pricing mechanism. 
State Variables and Constraints
We denote the number of prosumers by N, and the set of prosumers by N := {1, 2, ..., N}. A day is divided to T slots, and the set of time slots is defined by T := {1, 2, ..., T }. For each day, each prosumer i ∈ N attempts to maximize his/her profit by determining his/her plan for consumption, production and transaction of electricity for each time slot of the following day. The variables that the i-th prosumer receives and controls are shown in Table 1 and illustrated in Fig. 1 . The constraints on the upper and lower bounds of the variables are also shown in Table 1 . The superscripts · + means outflow from the smart meter, and · − means inflow into the smart meter, respectively. The generation of the PV of the i-th prosumer at time t is represented by L t− i , as follows:
The standard deviation represents the uncertainty of the PV generation, and can be regarded as a "risk." The stochastic variable H t ∈ (−∞, ∞) is assumed to be drawn from a standard normal distribution N(0, 1), as
Note that we assume that each house follows the same H t at time t. This assumption represents the strong correlation in the generation all of PVs in a regional electricity network. This model makes use of the property of i-Rene that all houses in the network have PVs, and they are all located in the same neighborhood. Typically, H t corresponds to the fluctuation in the flux of solar radiation. We assume that each agent can observe H t as public information. At each time step, each prosumer can adjust his/her behavior by considering H t in a real-time manner. In the definitions of the state variables shown in Table 1 , the first terms represent expectations and the second terms represent probabilistic fluctuations.
The decision variables are summarized as follows:
).
We assume that each prosumer determines x i every day for the day-ahead market in the regional electricity market.
The relationships between the variables also must obey the following constraints. For each house, the law of conservation of energy should be satisfied at each time slot t:
The condition (6) is satisfied for arbitrary H t if and only if the following equations are satisfied: In this paper, we consider the optimization problem that optimizes the state variables in a day-ahead market so as to satisfy (6) for arbitrary H t . That is, we deal with the uncertainty of the PVs. Hence, we consider the optimization problem for x t i that satisfies (7) and (8) .
The storage profile s t i represents the state of charge (SOC) of the battery in the i-th house at time t. We assume that the dynamics of the battery is described as follows.
where s must be balanced at every moment. Therefore, it must hold that i∈N (γm
where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents network efficiency. The condition (13) is satisfied for arbitrary H t if and only if the following equations are satisfied:
For each decision variable and the SOC of each battery for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T, we assume that the following chance constraints hold:
Pr[0 ≤ḡ
Pr
where δ ∈ [0, 1] represents risk bounds that are specified in advance.
The chance constraints (16) - (33) can be converted to deterministic constraints. For example, (16) can be transformed into an equivalent deterministic constraint as follows:
where 
0 ≤b
0 ≤m
0 ≤ḡ
Social Welfare
First, we define the welfare of the i-th individual prosumer in the regional network W i : R 16T × R T × R T → R as follows:
where p μ = (p μt ) t∈T and p σ = (p σt ) t∈T represent the prices of the expectation and standard deviation, i.e., risk, and 
The purpose of the electricity network is not to maximize the welfare of individual prosumer, but to maximize the social welfare of the prosumers. Here, we define the social welfare of the regional network W : R 16NT × R T × R T → R as a sum of the welfare of the individual prosumers W i as follows:
Meanwhile, by substituting the constraints balancing demand and supply within the regional electricity market (14) and (15) into (62), the social welfare W is reduced to
according to the conditions (14) and (15) where
). The expectation of the social welfare W is calculated as
Main Problem
The main problem that should be solved by the regional electricity network as a whole is defined as the maximization of the expected social welfare W. The main problem is thus defined as follows:
subject to x i ∈ X i ∀i ∈ N,
where X i is the feasible set shown in Appendix A. Here, the main problem (Problem 1) is a convex optimization problem. Therefore, it has at least one optimal solution, and the solution is a global optimal solution.
Dual Problem
Here, the dual problem (Problem 2) corresponding to the main problem (Problem 1) is derived. The dual problem can be decomposed into several sub-problems (Problem 3) and a master-problem (Problem 4). The simultaneous solution of the sub-problems and the master-problem gives the optimal solution of the main problem and the dual problem, i.e., there is no duality gap. This fact is supported by the strong duality of the main problem. Note that this is a natural extension of Lemma 2 in [27] .
), (72) where λ μ := (λ μt ) t∈T and λ σ := (λ σt ) t∈T . In the above, λ μt ∈ R and λ σt ∈ R are Lagrange multipliers that relax the constraints (69) and (70) on balancing demand and supply, respectively. In general, when a constraint relaxed by a Lagrange multiplier is in the form of a linear equation regarding goods, it is known that the Lagrange multiplier represents the price of the goods [28] .
In this case, λ μ and λ σ represent price profiles of the expectation of electricity p μ and the risk of electricity p σ , respectively.
Sub-Problem
The objective function (71) of the dual problem (Problem 2) can be divided into N individual problems, given the price profiles in the regional electricity market λ μt ∈ R and λ σt ∈ R [28] . In this case, the problem that should be solved for the i-th prosumer, i.e., the i-t sub-problem, is described as follows:
subject to x i ∈ X i .
The optimal solution of the problem is described as follows:
Master-Problem
Given the optimal solution of the sub-problems x * i (λ μ , λ σ ), the optimal price profiles λ μ and λ σ optimize the dual problem by solving the following master-problem. , } t∈T to the regional market. 6:
The regional market solves the master-problem (problem 4) and updates the price profiles. λ
Pricing Mechanism Based on Dual Decomposition with the Sub-Gradient Method
The sub-gradient method is widely employed for solving the master-problem [28] , [33] . Various pricing algorithms have been derived using decomposition and the sub-gradient method [4] , [17] , [27] . In this paper, we derive a pricing mechanism based on dual decomposition with the sub-gradient method for the target system.
A pseudo code of the proposed pricing mechanism for the dual problem (problem 2) is described in Algorithm 1.
In the algorithm, the price profiles λ σ are updated using the sub-gradient method [4] , [34] , as
where ξ
: R T × R T → R are subgradients for expectation and risk of electricity, respectively. The variable θ (k) t denotes the learning rate at the k-th step. If
2 = 0, the convergence of Algorithm 1 is guaranteed by [35] . For further detail, please refer to [27] .
Experiments
Now, we evaluate our proposed pricing mechanism through a numerical experiment.
Conditions
We prepared a virtual electricity network in a simulation environment. The parameters of the target model were set as shown in Table 2 . The utility and cost functions and their expectations were set as follows: The profile of the PV generation for each prosumer was set as shown in Fig. 2 . The solid line shows the expectation of the generation, and the error bars indicate the standard deviations for each time slot. The profiles of the expectations for the generation of the PVs were obtained from 10 PV cells in Higashi Ohmi city, Japan. We chose five large PV cells and five small PV cells for the generation profiles to observe frequent electricity transactions between houses. Without differences in generation and consumption, electricity transactions among houses, i.e., m t± i would rarely be conducted. These were measured between 1st July and 30th September 2010 [36] . The standard deviations were set equal to the expectations ×0.3. The price profiles were initialized to p In this experiment, the performances of market mechanisms are compared from the viewpoint of the average of social wel- Table 3 Penalties for violations of constraints.
Constraints
Lower bound penalties Upper bound penalties Consumption (A. 10) p
The simulation was performed 10000 times, and the averaged social welfare was calculated. In each trial, the decision variables are determined so as to maximize the expected utility. The determined plan was evaluated using {H t } t∈T drawn from a normal distribution at each trial.
When any of the constraints (A. 10) -(A. 17) and (A. 27) were violated, the penalties shown in Table 3 were incurred, i.e., the penalties were subtracted from the social welfare. Basically, each penalty is designed by referring to the cost that is required to fulfill the size of the violation by buying/selling electricity from/to the outside grid.
Results
The averaged social welfare and its standard deviation obtained using each of the comparative methods is presented in Table 4 . This table shows that Methods 1 and 2 clearly outperformed the conventional method, i.e., a pricing mechanism using dual decomposition with a sub-gradient method that does not consider uncertainty in the PV generation. This implies that considering uncertainty explicitly is crucially important for regional electricity networks where PVs are installed and play an important role. Furthermore, Method 1 outperformed Method 2. Thus, it is demonstrated that a day-ahead market that considers "risk" can contribute to increased social welfare for i-Rene. Even though the difference between the social welfare obtained by Methods 1 and 2 was smaller than that between Methods 2 and 3, the difference is still significant 1 . We performed t-test , and it showed that Method 1 is significantly superior to Method 2 (p = 5.9 × 10 −13 ). Figure 3 presents a sample of the results of the simulation experiment. The top figure shows the expectation and standard deviation of the PV generation, and an actual observation of PV generation and its stochastic variable H t for one day. The middle figure shows the obtained social welfare at each time slot. This indicates that the proposed method was able to handle the uncertainty and increase social welfare at each time slot except for small numerical errors in contrast to Method 3. The bottom presents the formed price profiles. This shows that the formed electricity price was reduced during the daytime. This is a reasonable phenomenon, because during the daytime the net supply from the PVs increases. Interestingly, the price of the standard deviation became negative. This means that the additional generation of the PVs produces surplus electricity for the regional electricity network, and decreases the electricity price, especially around the noon. This also constitutes quite a reasonable result. Figure 4 summarizes the violations of constraints (A. 10) -(A. 17) and (A. 27) caused by the uncertainty of PV generation. As an example, the figure shows the result for the 1st prosumer over 10000 days. Among all of the constraints, violations were found only for h t17 , h t21 , and h t22 . The ratio of the violation refers to #(Violation at time t)/#(Trials), the averaged amount of violation presents the sum of the absolute values for each violation, and the averaged penalty presents the sum of the penalties for each violation. Regarding h t22 , although violations were observed, the overall violation is negligible. Note that the rate of violation was almost bounded by the risk bound δ = 0.05 that was set in Table 2 . Meanwhile, the sum of the penalties in the network was 0.78 per day. This is fairly small compared with the difference between the social welfare of Method 1 and that of Method 2. This means that the proposed method was able to deal with the uncertainty caused by PV generation effectively in a real-time manner by considering the chance constraints. 
Conclusion
This paper has described a novel risk-limiting real-time pricing market mechanism for a regional electricity network of prosumers with distributed solar power generation. The target system, i-Rene, is composed of many prosumers, each equipped with a battery and a renewable energy-based generator. In particular, they are each assumed to have a PV. In our model, the two factors of uncertainty and the strong correlation between the generation of PVs were taken into consideration, in addition to the characteristics of regional networks of prosumers, such as a regional market, batteries, and an outside grid as a back-up power source. In the proposed market mechanism, each prosumer not only sets prices and bids for the amount of electricity that he/she sells or buys, but also sets prices and bids for a parameter that is used to cope with the uncertainty induced by solar power generation in a day-ahead market. The performance of the proposed mechanism was demonstrated numerically through a simulation experiment. It outperformed a conventional real-time pricing method that does not consider uncertainty, and a method that does not involve trading of the parameter for coping with uncertainty.
The proposed mechanism is regarded as a probabilistic extension of that of Fukui et al. [27] , and an application of the work of Yo et al. [17] to a regional electricity network of prosumers whose main generators are PVs. However, the formulation and obtained results are new and significant.
In the following, we describe some directions for future study. Applying the proposed mechanism to substantial electricity networks and evaluating the applicability of our mechanism are our next challenges. In our model, we assumed that the PV generation fluctuates according to a Gaussian distribution, and that its true model can be predicted. However, in real situations, modeling and estimation errors are inevitably incurred. The evaluation and mitigation of such errors is important for real-world applications. In addition, we assumed a "complete" correlation between the PV generation of the prosumers, i.e., 
